On July 18, as the investigation into the anti-dumping measures on solar-grade polysilicon was nearing its one-year mark, the Ministry of Commerce finally announced the preliminary ruling on imports from the United States and South Korea. The decision imposed temporary anti-dumping duties in the form of deposit margins. Specifically, the dumping margin for U.S. imports was set between 53.3% and 57%, while South Korean imports faced a range of 2.4% to 48.7%. This move marked a significant step in China’s broader effort to address unfair trade practices.
However, the European Union, another key player in the same product market, was notably absent from this initial ruling. On November 1, 2012, China officially launched a “double-reverse†investigation against EU solar-grade polysilicon, merging it with the earlier investigation on U.S. and South Korean imports that had been initiated on July 20 of the same year. Despite this merger, officials emphasized that the cases remained legally separate, with the EU filing occurring more than three months after the U.S. and South Korea.
According to sources close to the case, the merger was primarily aimed at improving administrative efficiency, given that the injury assessment for Chinese enterprises was similar across all regions. However, the legal procedures required each case to be handled independently, with the maximum timeline for resolution being 18 months from the date of filing. Some industry experts suggested that even if the full investigations were not completed, the damage assessment for the domestic industry should have been finalized by now.
The attention surrounding China’s preliminary findings on EU polysilicon is closely tied to the ongoing trade dispute between China and the EU, particularly the EU’s “double-reverse†investigation against China’s photovoltaic sector. Recent reports indicated that Germany, as the largest exporter of polysilicon to China, had reached an agreement with Beijing to avoid imposing anti-dumping duties on EU polysilicon. This arrangement would protect German industries, which are heavily impacted by such measures.
According to data from the Silicon Industry Branch of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association, Germany, the U.S., and South Korea account for 60%, 55%, and 50% of China’s polysilicon imports, respectively. In the broader photovoltaic case, Germany has aligned itself with China, choosing not to impose tariffs or seek favorable terms in exchange for support.
While the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has not confirmed these reports, some industry insiders believe there may be strategic considerations at play. Given the massive stakes involved in the photovoltaic dispute, negotiations between the two sides are expected to involve complex trade-offs. Some speculate that the EU’s preliminary ruling on anti-dumping could serve as a bargaining chip in the larger negotiation process.
In response to pressure from domestic polysilicon companies, Chinese authorities delayed the release of the preliminary results for the U.S., South Korea, and EU cases. Companies urged the government to handle the EU and other cases separately, and the suggestion was accepted. Officials reportedly believed that resolving the broader issue with the EU should take precedence through diplomatic dialogue rather than immediate enforcement.
On June 4, the EU announced a preliminary duty of 11.8% on Chinese photovoltaic products, with the potential to rise to 47.6% by August 6 if no agreement is reached. With just 18 days left, the window for negotiations is rapidly closing. While most terms have been agreed upon, the core issue of pricing remains unresolved. The price difference between China and Europe has narrowed from 0.15 euros per watt to 0.05 euros, a small but critical gap for Chinese PV firms.
Sources suggest that the Chinese delegation had already drafted a price commitment plan before their trip to Europe, waiting only for final price negotiations. If no major obstacles arise, the agreement is expected to be finalized by August 6.
Despite the preliminary rulings, the domestic polysilicon industry remains in crisis. A recent report by the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association showed that in the first half of the year, production dropped by 23.6% to 28,000 tons. Out of 43 active companies, only six were operating at minimal capacity, while the rest had shut down entirely. This means that 86% of the industry is idle, with overall capacity utilization below 30%.
Industry analysts noted that while the import restrictions on U.S. and South Korean polysilicon may temporarily boost domestic prices, the long-term recovery remains uncertain. Lin Ruhai, an industry expert, predicted that prices would stabilize between 150,000 and 160,000 yuan per ton in the second half of the year, with effective capacity returning to around 110,000 tons. However, 90,000 tons of capacity would still remain unused, and many small companies may eventually exit the market.
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